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This paper develops a model which explains the unequal employment outcomes of two groups - 
defined as their, respective, likelihoods of successfully filling job vacancies - in terms of 
disparities in their access to job networks. This disparity arises because a proportion of vacancies 
are filled using informal methods so that, as a first step, information about vacancies only 
becomes available through word-of-mouth; as a second step, appointments are based on the 
recommendations of existing employees. If society is fragmented, then members of one group 
will have little or no contact with members of the other group. Therefore, the power to inform 
and to recommend becomes excessively concentrated in the group that dominates the workforce. 
In such a situation, the role of fair-employment regulation is to ensure fair access to jobs for all. 
While this generates equity gains, it could, by raising the costs of hiring and firing, also be 
accompanied by efficiency losses. Whether social welfare increases or decreases as a result of 
regulation depends on the relative magnitudes of these gains and losses. 
JEL Classification: J71 
Introduction 
An important concern of public policy is to ensure that persons of different sex, ethnic 
backgrounds, religion, colour etc., are treated fairly in the labour market. The existence of bodies 
in the United Kingdom like the Equal Opportunities Commission, the Commission for Racial 
Equality and the Fair Employment Commission (coupled with the prominence given by the 
media to their findings) and the existence in the USA of the Civil Rights Act (coupled with the 
prominence given by the media to judgements based on the Act), bears testimony to this. There 
are two aspects to this concern. The first is whether differences in the remuneration to different 
persons fully reflect disparities in their productivity or whether such differences are, wholly or in 
part, the result of ``earnings discrimination''. The disparity in the USA between the earnings of 
Southern Blacks and equally educated Whites prompted Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act 
banning discrimination in employment on grounds of race, sex and religion. The second aspect 
relates to the differential chances, of persons from different groups, of finding suitable 
employment. Here the concern is whether the different degrees of success that persons from 
different groups have in finding jobs can be justified by inter-group differences in worker 
attributes, or whether they are the result of ``employment discrimination''. The disparity in 
Northern Ireland between the proportion of the Catholic and Protestant labour forces that were 
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employed led to the 1989 Fair Employment (NI) Act. This Act put in place legislation to secure 
fair participation in employment for the two communities in Northern Ireland and created a Fair 
Employment Commission (FEC) to oversee its implementation. 
This paper is concerned with the second issue. As Arrow (1998) has observed, although this is 
the more important of the two issues - in the sense of occurring more frequently in the ``real 
world'' - it is also the more neglected. The question most frequently asked in the literature on 
discrimination concerns the effect of segregated employment on the wages of the group 
discriminated against. However, as Higgs (1977) and Whately and Wright (1994) have argued in 
the context of the US labour market, black and white wages for the same job rarely differed by 
much. Instead, discrimination took the form of restricting the range of jobs to which Black 
persons were hired
3
. In similar fashion, Catholics in Northern Ireland were excluded from a 
range of industrial jobs, particular those relating to the Harland and Wolf shipyards - Northern 
Ireland's largest employer - in Belfast (Smith and Chambers, 1991). 
The usual line of explanation, in economics, for employment discrimination follows the 
argument of Becker (1971): some White (or Protestant) employers, by attaching a special 
disutility to contact with Black (or Catholic) workers, have a ``taste for discrimination'' and this 
leads them to either exclude the offending persons from their workforce or to greatly restrict 
their numbers. In effect, the maximand of such employers contains, in addition to profits, a 
``taste-related'' argument. Discriminating employers, by indulging their taste for discrimination, 
would earn a lower level of profits than their non-discriminating counterparts (who maximised 
only on profits) and would, therefore, eventually be driven out of business. Many economists 
have concluded from this analysis that market forces would lead discrimination to die a natural 
death and that, therefore, the helping hand of the legislative physician was not required. In 
addition, as Donohue (1998) points out, Becker's work strengthened the resolve of those who, 
philosophically, were opposed to state regulation. For example, Friedman (1962) argued that 
anti-discrimination legislation was conceptually no different from legislation (for example, like 
Hitler's Nuremberg laws) requiring employers to impose special disabilities on certain groups. 
Another explanation for discrimination (Krueger, 1963; Lewis, 1979; McAdams, 1995) is that its 
practice may accord with the collective interest of a group: the discriminating group - Whites in 
apartheid South Africa; Hutus in Burundi - acquires (economic, political and social) status by 
restricting the job opportunities of other groups and it imposes these restrictions by 
discriminating against them. In this ``status-production'' model, the forces generating 
discrimination stem not from the preferences of (some) individuals but from the collective 
preference of the group. Individuals within the group, who seek to break the group's injunctions 
against association with members of other groups, risk being penalised by their peers through 
inter alia: economic boycott; social ostracism; and violence against them and their property. 
The third explanation for discrimination which is important in the economics literature is based 
on ``statistical discrimination'' (Phelps, 1972). Suppose that two groups, on average, do differ in 
terms of productivity - or that employers believe that they do - where these productivity 
differences are due to differences in some work-related attribute which is difficult, if not 
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impossible, to observe (say, quality of education). In such situations, employers may use some 
observable quality (say, ethnicity) as a surrogate for these unobservable differences in attributes. 
Consequently, members of a particular group may be denied employment because employers 
feel that, on the balance of probabilities, they are likely to get better workers from other groups. 
This is a market-based explanation for discrimination which does not require tastes for 
discrimination. 
The objections to Becker's (1971) model are well-known and have been set out succinctly by 
Arrow (1998). Briefly, they are that: (i) the introduction of additional variables into the 
maximand risks turning the theory into a tautology; (ii) a large fraction of the workforce is hired 
by large corporations and it is difficult to ascribe discriminatory tastes to impersonal entities; (iii) 
the theory does not explain discrimination by occupation; (iv) the theory predicts the demise of 
precisely the phenomenon it is meant to explain (Arrow, 1972). The McAdams (1995) model has 
been criticised by Epstein (1995): the relevance of discrimination based on social norms has 
diminished considerably in the modern world and many of the examples cited in support of the 
model - apartheid laws in South Africa; segregation laws in the Southern US states; the 
Protestant hegemony over jobs and housing in Northern Ireland - are defunct. The problem with 
statistical discrimination is that it can become a self-fulfilling prophecy. The rejection of 
applicants from a particular group by employers, who mistakenly believe that group identity and 
worker ability are correlated, could discourage members of the rejected group from making the 
human capital investments needed to be a good worker thus fulfilling employers' expectations 
that persons from this group do not make good workers
4
 (Elmslie and Sedo, 1996). 
Against this background, this paper develops a model which explains the unequal employment 
outcomes of two groups (Blacks and Whites) - defined as their, respective, likelihoods of 
successfully filling job vacancies - without resorting to the assumption that (some) employers, as 
individuals, have a taste for discrimination or to the assumption that prevailing social norms 
support discrimination and that individual employers depart from these norms at their peril. Nor 
does the model assume that (some) employers believe that group identity and worker quality are 
correlated. Instead, ``discrimination'' in the model arises, in the first instance, because 
information about vacancies is a private good which is available in unequal measure to Blacks - 
who receive less of it - and to Whites - who receive more of it. 
This occurs because a proportion of jobs are filled through informal recruitment methods so that, 
as a first step, information about vacancies only becomes available by word-of-mouth; as a 
second step, appointments are based on the recommendations of existing employees. If society is 
fragmented then members of one group will have little or no contact with - or, if they do have 
contact, little or no sympathy for - members of the other group. In such a situation, the power to 
inform and to recommend is inordinately concentrated in the group that dominates the 
workforce. If this group happens to be Whites, then Blacks have a lower chance of filling 
vacancies because, relative to White job-seekers, they lack both information about vacancies and 
sponsors to support their applications. The two forces that drive the model are, therefore, 
informal recruitment methods and social fragmentation and these two forces acting in concert 
result in a jobs-network (Rees and Schultz, 1970; Granovetter, 1974 and 1988; White, 1995). The 
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central point of the model is to show that because Black job-seekers do not have the same degree 
of access to the jobs-network as do White job-seekers, their employment outcomes are worse 
than those for Whites. 
The purpose of fair-employment regulation is to afford fairer participation in employment for 
members of the disadvantaged group. This involves emasculating the jobs-network by insisting 
that all information about vacancies be publicly available and that the ensuing recruitment 
process be both transparent and accountable
5
. The result of these interventions is equity-gain. 
However, these statutory requirements, taken collectively, could significantly raise hiring (and 
firing) costs and, compared to the pre-regulatory situation, lead to fewer vacancies being 
announced. This is identified in the model as the efficiency-loss from regulation. Whether 
fair-employment regulation leads to a net increase in welfare or not depends on comparing the 
welfare-magnitudes of the gains and losses. The model proposes a method, based on Atkinson's 
(1970) analysis of income inequality, for effecting such a comparison. 
The Analytical Framework 
There are  M   economically active persons in a region, of whom a proportion       0.5   
are White, the remainder,  1  ,   being Black. There is a single employer (call it a firm) in the 
region. This firm has  E   employees all of whom do a particular type of job and all of whom 
are paid the same wage,  s.   A proportion          of the employees are White, the 
remainder,  1  ,   being Black. The profits of the firm are:  
  ryE  sE   #   
 
 where:  yE   is the firm's production function ( yE  0   and  yE  0   and  r   is the 
output price .   By assumption, both the product and the labour markets are competitive so that  
r   and  s   are invariant with respect to, respectively, changes in output and in employment. 
By definition, there are  U  M  E,   unemployed persons in the region of whom  
UW  M  E   are White and  UB  U  UW  1  M  1  E   are Black. The 
unemployment rate for Whites and Blacks are, respectively:  
uW 
M  E
M
 1 

 1  u 
  
 

 u
uB 
1  M  1  E
1  M

  
1  

1  
1  
u
  #   
  #   
 
 where:  u  M  E/M  is the overall unemployment rate. The three unemployment rates -  
u,uW   and  uB   - are linked by the relationship:  
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uW  1  uB  u   #    
 
A vacancy now occurs in this firm. This vacancy may be filled by informal or by formal 
methods. Informal methods comprise filling the vacancy on the basis of recommendations by 
existing employees. Formal methods, on the other hand, involve filling the vacancy by means of 
a process which inter alia involves: publicly advertising the job, scrutinising applications, taking 
up references, and conducting job interviews. 
Informal Recruitment Methods 
Each employee knows at least one person who is unemployed and who would like to fill this 
vacancy and he informs one, and only one, of these persons of the vacancy. In effect, every 
employee ``votes'' for a person on the unemployment list with a view to informing him of the 
vacancy. Consequently,  E   votes are cast - two, or more, voters may vote for the same person - 
and  E

    U   unemployed persons are informed of the vacancy (receive votes). These  
E   persons (the ``successful candidates'') constitute the pool of applicants for the vacancy. 
Since they were made aware of the vacancy through the strength of their contacts with existing 
employees, they may be regarded as belonging to a job-network where a job-network is defined 
as the set of unemployed persons, each of whom is the preferred choice (for filling the vacancy) 
of at least one employee. 
The firm, which has to fill the vacancy from one of these  E

  applicants, has no reason to 
prefer one applicant over another. However, it would like to place suitable weight on the number 
of votes received by each applicant and, in order to do so, it enters each applicant's name on as 
many separate slips of paper as the number of votes received by the applicant. Then, from this 
collection of  E   slips of paper, it picks one at random: the person whose name appears on the 
slip gets the job. 
Assume that  B   and  W   are the, respective, probabilities that Black and White employees 
recommend someone of the same colour,  1  B   and  1  W   being the, respective, 
probabilities that they recommend someone of a different colour. Then, of the total number of 
slips of paper  E   in the hat, the expected proportions that have the names of White and of 
Black persons (denoted  qW   and  qB ,   respectively) are:  
qW  W  1  1  B
qB  1  W  1  B
  #   
  #   
 
 where:  qW  qB  1  . Since all the applicants are viewed equally favorably by the employer,  
qW   and  qB   may be regarded as the respective likeihoods of a White and of a Black person 
filling the vacant position, when the vacancy is filled using informal methods. The values of  B   
and  W   measure the degree to which society is ``fragmented'' along racial lines, with lower 
values of  B   and  W   reflecting smaller degrees of fragmentation or, equivalently, higher 
degrees of integration. Note that  qW/W  0,    qB/B  0.   Two cases may be 
highlighted: complete fragmentation and complete integration. 
Complete Fragmentation 
If  B  W  1,   so that Black employees would never recommend for the vacancy a 
unemployed person who was White, and vice-versa, then society is completely fragmented by 
race and  qW    and  qB  1    : the likelihood of a Black person filling a vacancy 
depends entirely on the proportionate presence of Black workers on the firm's payroll. On the 
other hand, if all the employees in the firm are White, then    1   and  qW  W   and  
qB  1  W  : the likelihood of a Black person filling a vacancy depends entirely on the 
likelihood of White workers recommending Black persons. If society is completely fragmented 
and all employees are White, then  qW  1   and  qB  0  : vacancies will never be filled by 
Black persons. 
Complete Integration 
The counter-point to complete fragmentation is complete integration. This occurs when 
recommendations are ``colour-blind'' so that the likelihood of an employee, irrespective of his 
colour, recommending a Black or a White person is given by the respective proportions of Black 
and White job-seekers in the total of unemployed persons. More formally, under complete 
integration:  
W 
M  E
U
 M
U
 M  U
U

  
u    1  B
B  1  W 
  
u  1    1  W
  #   
  #   
 
 so that, substituting the expressions for  W   and  B   from equations (cinw) and (cinb) into 
equations (qw) and (qb) yields:  
qW  W  1  1  B  W  1  W 
  
u  
qB  1  W  1  B  B  1  B 
  
u  1  
  #   
  #   
 
 
Formal versus Informal Recruitment Methods 
The alternative to filling the vacancy by informal methods is to fill it using formal methods. 
These involve, as a first step, the public advertisement of the vacancy. Suppose that this attracts 
applications from all the  U  M  E   unemployed persons in the region. Subsequent steps in 
the process of filling the vacancy using formal methods involve, as noted above: scrutinising 
applications; taking up references; conducting interviews etc.. 
The disadvantages, to the firm, of using formal methods are two. First, formal methods are more 
costly - if the costs of filling a vacancy by informal and formal methods are, respectively,  cE   
and  cF ,   then, by assumption,  cE  cF.   Assume without loss of generality that  cE  0   
so that  cF  0.   The second disadvantage is that formal methods require time to implement - 
by assumption, there is a delay of    0   periods between the decision to fill the vacancy and 
the new employee starting work and the cost of this delay is reflected in lost production of  
yE   and in lost profits of  ryE  s.   By contrast, under informal methods, the new 
worker can start as soon as the vacancy is to be filled. 
The advantage to the firm of using formal methods is that these would lead to a larger number of 
applicants: under informal methods, only  E
  U   persons would be considered for the vacant 
position but, under formal methods, there would be an additional  F  U  E   applicants. 
Consequently, the firm may end up with a ``better'' worker. Let  E   and  F   denote, 
respectively, the firm's expectation of the marginal product of a worker recruited through 
informal and through formal methods,  E  F.   
Then the expected net advantage,  A,  to the firm, of filling the vacancy using formal, instead of 
informal, methods is:  
A  

T
F  Eeitdt  
0

E  weitdt  cF   #   
 
 where  T   in equation (ADV) represents the number of periods the job is expected to last (the 
``life'' of the job) and  i   is the discount rate. The first term in the above expression is the 
present value of the additional profit stream expected from employing a worker through formal 
methods. The second term is the present value of the forgone profits arising from the delay, 
arising from formal methods, in the new employee starting work: this is the additional profit the 
firm could have earned if the worker had, instead, been recruited informally. The last term is 
simply the fixed cost associated with filling the vacancy through formal methods. It is assumed 
that the firm is risk-neutral so that the different terms in equation (ADV) can be directly 
compared. 
From equation (ADV), the firm will fill its vacancy using informal methods if  A  0,   and fill 
it using formal methods if  A  0.   For routine jobs - with a high degree of specificity in terms 
of performance and standards, which are easily supervised and monitored, in which the worker's 
flair and enterprise is not likely to be of importance, and for which the quality of training is fairly 
uniform - there would not be much difference between  F   and  E  . Opening up such 
vacancies - in general connected with unskilled, semi-skilled, skilled manual/non-manual or 
technical jobs - to public competition would not be likely to yield better workers and the firm 
would prefer to recruit using informal methods. On the other hand, where standards of job 
performance vary according to the quality of training received by the worker and according to 
his skill, initiative and enterprise, the firm might expect that the public advertisement of the 
vacancy would attract a better class of applicant than that supplied by the recommendations of 
existing employees: a significant difference between  F   and  E   would lead the firm to 
prefer formal methods. 
Employment Chances under Formal and 
Informal Recruitment Methods 
Under formal methods of recruitment all unemployed persons in a region learn of a vacancy and 
apply for it. Of these unemployed persons, a proportion  pW   are White and  pB   are Black, 
where:  
pW 
M  E
U
 M
U
 M  U
U

  
u  
pB  1  qW 
  
u  1  
  #   
  #   
 
 where:  pW  pB  1   and  pW/  1  1/u  0   and  pB/  1/u  1  0,   if  u  1  
. If skills and abilities are equally distributed between Blacks and Whites, then  pW   and  pB   
may be regarded as the, respective, likelihoods of a White and of a Black person being appointed 
to the vacant position, when the vacancy is filled using formal methods. 
Whether Blacks would be more likely to get employment under formal, compared to informal, 
methods of filling vacancies would depend on the degree of social fragmentation (by race) as 
measured by the values of the parameters,  B   and  W.   If  B  W  1,   so that society 
is completely fragmented then (remembering that     ), from equations (pw) and (qw),  
pW   
  
u    qW  pB  qB   #    
 so that the likelihood of a Black person filling a job-vacancy would be higher if the firm 
adopted formal, instead of informal, methods of recruitment. 
However, if society were completely integrated, so that the values of  B   and  W   were 
given by equations (cinw) and (cinb), respectively, then  pW  qW   and  pB  qB.   In other 
words, formal recruitment methods produce the same result in terms of the chances of Blacks 
and Whites filling a vacancy as would informal recruitment methods in societies that were 
completely integrated. 
However, complete integration is a sufficient but not a necessary condition for the likelihood of a 
Black or a White person filling a job-vacancy
6
 to be invariant with respect to the method of 
recruitment adopted. Suppose that  B  W.   Then from equations (pw) and (qw) a necessary 
and sufficient condition for  pW  qW   and for  pB  qB   is:  
  1 
  
u2  1
 1   #   
 
 Comparing the expression for     from equation (comp2) with that of  W   from equation 
(cinw) it is evident that
7
:  
  1 
  
u2  1
  
  
u  W    1  B   #   
 
 Equation (gwb) shows that the probability of White employees recommending a White person 
is greater than what would be implied by complete integration: notwithstanding this, the 
probability of a Black or a White person filing the vacancy would not depend upon the method 
of recruitment. Consequently, it is possible, even under conditions of less than complete 
integration, for Blacks, in terms of their likelihood of filling a vacancy, to be as well off under 
informal, as under formal, recruitment methods. However, in practice, from equation (comp2), 
the ``break-even'' value of     is unlikely to be realised. For example, if one imposed the 
constraint the    0.5,   then from equation (comp2):  
  1 
  
u2  1
 0.5  u 
2  
2  1
  #   
 
                                                          
6
Indeed, if the value of     was low enough, the likelihood of Blacks filling a vacancy would be 
higher under informal, than under formal, methods of recruitment. 
 
 
7
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 If, for example,    0.7   and    0.6   then, for the break-even degree of social 
fragmentation to be achieved,  u  0.5.   Realistically, therefore, with less than complete 
integration, Blacks would be more likely to fill a vacancy if the firm adopted formal, as opposed 
to informal, methods of recruitment. 
Fair Employment Policies 
Suppose that, against the background of the basic model outlined above, the firm has  V    
 U   vacancies and of these it decides to fill a proportion     using formal methods and the 
remainder,  1  ,   by informal methods. That is, in terms of equation (ADV),  A  0   for a 
fraction     of these vacancies,  A  0,   for the remainder. Then the likelihood of White and 
Black persons filling these vacancies, represented by  W   and  B   respectively are:  
W  pW  1  qW
B  pB  1  qB
  #   
  #   
 
 where:  dW/d  0,    dB/d  0,   the values of  W   and  B   being, 
respectively, minimised and maximised when    1.   
The government, observing the small number of vacancies filled by Blacks, sets up a Fair 
Employment Commission (FEC) to redress the racial imbalance in employment. The FEC, acting 
under powers assigned to it by Fair Employment legislation, imposes transparency in recruitment 
on the firm by requiring that all vacancies be filled using formal methods. It requires that the 
firm publicly advertise all its vacancies and it specifies detailed procedures - perhaps more 
rigorous than the firm acting on its own would have followed - that need to be followed before a 
vacancy can be filled. As a consequence the firm is forced to eschew informal methods of 
recruitment so that    1.   
Social Welfare and Inequality 
The Social Welfare Function 
For a given number of vacancies,  V,   that are filled, let  VB   and  VW   represent, 
respectively, the numbers of vacancies filled by Blacks and by Whites and let  v  V/U,   
represent the proportion of unemployed persons in the region who were able to find employment 
while  vB  VB/UB   and  vW  VW/UW   represent, respectively, the proportion of Black, and 
of White, job-seekers who obtained employment. Then  v,    v B   and  v W   may be thought of 
(and are referred to in this paper as) the likelihood of successful job-search of, respectively: all 
job-seekers; Black job-seekers; White job-seekers. The relationship between the three 
likelihoods is given by:  
v  V
U
 VB
U
 VW
U
 VB
UB
UB
U
M
MB
MB
M
 VW
UW
UW
U
M
MW
MW
M
 v BuB/u1    v WuW/u   #    
 
Suppose that social welfare,  J,   can be written, for  k  B,W , in additively separable form, 
as:  
J  Jv B ,v W  
kB
W
UkFv k   #   
 
 The function  F.  0   in equation (SWF), represents society's valuation of the gain (to it) 
arising from persons in group  k   having a likelihood,  v k,  of successful job-search, with 
higher values of the group-specific function,  F.    representing higher levels of gain. The sum 
of the group-specific gains is the social welfare associated with a given overall likelihood of 
successful job search,  v.   
The change in the value of the social welfare function (SWF) of equation (SWF), following a 
change in the  v k  , is:  
J  
kB
W
akUkv k   #   
 
 where:  ak  Fv k/v k  0   is the social marginal gain attached to a change in the 
likelihood of successful job-search of members of group  k  . If it is assumed that the function  
F.    is strictly concave, then social marginal gain decreases for increases in  v k.   
Consequently, for a given overall likelihood,  v,   social welfare is maximised, when the 
likelihood of successful job-search is the same for persons in the different groups, that is when:  
vB  vW.   
The SWF has constant elasticity if, for       0,    F.    can be written as:  
Fv k 
v k
1  1
1  
  #   
 
 since then:  ak  Fv k/v k  v k
  ak/v k/v k/ak    0   . Consequently, the 
percentage change in the welfare weights, following a percentage change in the likelihood of 
successful job-search, is both negative and constant. The greater the value of  ,   the greater 
the proportional decrease in the welfare weights in response to a proportional increase in the 
likelihood. The parameter     represent, as shown below, society's aversion to inter-group 
inequality in the likelihood of successful job-search. 
Inequality Aversion 
From equation (vu), the change in the overall likelihood of successful job-search,  v   is 
related to the changes in the group likelihoods since:  
v  vBuB/u1    vWuW/u   #    
 and if, in the above equation,  v  0,   then:  
 vW  vB
uB
uW
1  
  vB   #    
 where:    uB/uW   and    1  /   are, respectively, the ratios of unemployment rates, 
and of labour force shares, of Blacks and Whites. 
From equation (delta), and its accompanying properties, the change in the value of  J  , 
following changes in the Black and White likelihoods of successful job-search is:  
J  aBUBvB  aWUWvW  vW
UBvB  vW
UWvW   #    
 where:  vB/vW     and since, by assumption, the likelihood of successful job-search for 
Blacks is not greater than that for Whites,    1.   Setting  J  0   in equation (BWDJ) 
implies:  
 vW  vBUB/UW  vB
uB
uW
1  
 
  vB   #   
 
 Suppose  vB  1,   so that the likelihood of successful job-search by Blacks is increased by 1 
percentage point (pp). If the reduction in the likelihood of successful job-search by Whites,  
vW  ,   then social gain would decrease since  J  0   and if  vW  ,   then 
social gain would increase since  J  0.   
From equation (DJ), if    0,vW  .   This implies that society, in response to the fact that 
the likelihood of successful job-search is disproportionately high for White job-seekers, would be 
prepared to increase the likelihood of successful job-search by Blacks by 1pp, and to reduce that 
of Whites by an appropriate amount    , provided that in this redistribution the overall 
likelihood,  v,   did not change. 
If    0,   then, in order to increase the Black likelihood by 1 pp, society would be prepared to 
lower the White likelihood by  vW  .   Since    1,      1   (so that  
   ) and the overall likelihood of successful job-search falls. Since  vW/  0  , 
associated with higher values of     is society's willingness to accept a smaller number of 
vacancies (or, equivalently, a smaller overall likelihood of successful job-search)
8
 than that 
which currently exists, provided this smaller number of vacancies was filled more equitably, 
than hitherto, by Blacks and Whites. In this sense, the value of     represents the degree to 
which society is averse to inequality, between Blacks and Whites, in the likelihood of successful 
job-search, with higher values of     representing greater degrees of aversion. 
A Welfare-Based Measure of Inter-Group Inequality in 
the Likelihood of Successful Job-Search 
Let  v
  v   represent the overall likelihood of successful job-search which, if also the 
likelihood for Blacks and Whites, would yield the same level of social welfare as the existing 
distribution of likelihoods. Then  v

  may be termed the equally distributed equivalent 
likelihood of successful job-search. Following from this, Atkinson's (1970) inequality index 
applied to the distribution of likelihoods between Blacks and Whites yields
9
:  
                                                          
8
  logvW/   log  0   since    1   
 
 
9
By definition of  J,    F.    and  v : UFv  UkFv k  v/v1   
  Uk/Uv k/v1   
 
 
I  1  v/v  1  
kB
W
Uk
U
v k
v
1
1/1
  #   
 
 When    0,   society is indifferent as to how a given overall likelihood is distributed:  
v  v   and  I  0.   For    0,    v  v   and  I  0.   The higher the value of the 
inequality aversion parameter,  ,   the smaller will be the value of  v    and, therefore, higher 
will be the value of the inequality index,  J.   
Fair Employment Regulation and Welfare 
Improvement 
From equation (ATK), the ``equally distributed equivalent'' likelihood of successful job-search,  
v    remains unchanged for equi-proportionate changes in the Black and White likelihoods. 
This, however, does not imply that social welfare remains unchanged. Indeed, an 
equi-proportionate increase (decrease) in the likelihoods, by raising (lowering) the overall 
likelihood by the same proportion, would lead to an equi-proportionate increase (decrease) in 
social welfare
10
. To see this more clearly observe that in order to make comparisons of loss (or 
gain) across different overall likelihoods of successful job-search, a specific transformation, 
linking the inequality measure,  I   to different overall likelihoods,  v,   is needed. One obvious 
transformation is the reverse of the Atkinson transformation which yields the social welfare 
function:  
J  v1  I   #   
 
 which is  homogenous of degree one in the stop rates. The social welfare function in equation 
(logn) has a natural interpretation: the welfare from an overall likelihood of successful job search  
v   is reduced by the extent of inequality in the distribution of this likelihood between Blacks 
and Whites. 
Given an overall likelihood of successful job-search,  v,   equation (logn) says that the value of 
the Atkinson index  I   is a measure of the social welfare  J   associated with this overall 
likelihood. This welfare depends upon the distribution of this overall likelihood between Blacks 
and Whites (that is, in terms of their respective likelihoods of successful job-search,  v B   and  
v W  ) and upon the degree to which society is averse to inequality in the distribution of this 
likelihood (that is, the value of the inequality aversion parameter,    . 
Under fair employment regulation, for a given overall likelihood of successful job-search,  v     
V/U,   the likelihoods of successful job-search by Blacks and Whites are, respectively,  
vB
p  VB/UB  pBV/UB   and  vW
p  VW/UW  pWV/UW   while, in the absence of regulation, 
they were, respectively,  vB
  VB/UB  BV/UB   and  vW
  VW/UW  WV/UW,   where:  
vW
p  vW

  and  vB
p  vB

  with  vW
p  vW

  and  vB
p  vB

  if    1   (equations (thw) and 
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That is, the social welfare function is homogenous of degree one in the likelihoods. 
 
 
(thb)). Consequently,  J
p
  and  J

  denote, respectively, the social welfare associated with 
fair-employment regulation, and with the absence of fair-employment regulation, then, from 
equation (logn):  
Jp  J  v1  Ip  v1  I  vI  Ip   #   
 
 where  I
p
  and  I

  are the values of the inequality index in equation (ATK) when, 
respectively,  v k  v k
p
  and  v k  v k
,    k  B,W.   Since,  vB
p  vB
p  v,    Ip  0.   
However, since  I
  0,    Jp  J  0,   with  Jp  J  0,      1.   As long as some 
vacancies, in the absence of fair-employment regulation were filled using informal methods of 
recruitment, fair-employment regulation will increase social welfare. The amount by which 
regulation will increase social welfare will depend upon four factors: 
 the proportion of vacancies,  ,   that were, in the pre-regulation state, filled using formal 
methods: the lower the value of  ,   the greater will be the impact of regulation on welfare, 
the maximum impact occurring when    0   and the minimum (zero) impact occurring 
when    1.   
 the proportion of employees,  ,   that are White: ceteris paribus, the higher the value of     
the greater will be the rise in welfare following regulation, the rise being greatest when  
  1.   
 the degree to which society is fragmented: the higher the degree of fragmentation (that is, the 
larger the value of    ), the more will social welfare rise after regulation: the increase will 
be greatest when    1   and will be zero when     is defined by equation (comp2). 
 the degree to which society is inequality-averse: the smaller the value of the 
inequality-aversion parameter  ,   the smaller will be the impact of regulation on welfare, 
with    0   resulting in no increase in welfare. 
Fair-Employment Regulation and Efficiency 
Loss 
As a consequence of the regulatory activities of the FEC, the firm, for two reasons, incurs 
additional costs. First, costs go up because vacancies which earlier would have been filled 
through informal methods (the cost of which is zero) must now be filled using formal methods. 
Second, the cost of FEC-determined formal procedures may be higher than the cost of such 
procedures as determined by the firm. For example, the FEC may attach financial penalties to 
faulty compliance and, in order to avoid these penalties, the firm may have to make additional 
investments in acquiring appropriate expertise for its human resources department. The desire on 
the part of the firm to avoid error may also combine with the (possibly) more elaborate 
recruitment procedures laid down by the FEC so as to stretch out the recruitment process. 
Consequently, it is conceivable that the fixed cost of recruiting to a vacancy, and the lag between 
the decision to fill the vacancy and the new employee starting work, rise from  cF   and    , 
respectively, under the formal procedures devised by the firm, to  cF

  and  ,   respectively, 
under FEC-determined procedures. 
As a result of FEC regulations the costs to a firm, per vacancy, arising from its need to comply 
with FEC regulations in filling its vacancies, rise by:  
 cF
  cF  


E  sertdt  1   cF
  
0

E  sertdt   #   
 
 
The first and second terms in the first set of square brackets in equation (delc) are, respectively, 
the additional cost from filling a vacancy using formal procedures, and the increased opportunity 
cost arising from the longer delay in filling a vacancy, under FEC regulations. The third and 
fourth terms in the second set of squared brackets in equation (delc) are, respectively, the fixed 
cost that has now to be paid on vacancies that, in the absence of the FEC, would have been filled 
informally, and the forgone profits from the delay, resulting from the use of formal methods of 
recruitment, in appointing a worker. 
Because the FEC, for the two reasons discussed above, raises the cost of filling vacancies, fewer 
vacancies will be filled under it's regulatory regime. Some vacancies which were worth filling in 
the pre-regulation period (particularly those that, in the absence of regulation, would have been 
filled through informal methods) may no longer be worth filling under FEC-approved 
recruitment procedures. This, more often than not, will be the invidious result of the higher costs 
of filling vacancies and the longer delays in filling them, combining with the fact that some 
vacancies have a very short life-span. 
Suppose that, as a consequence of the higher recruitment costs imposed by FEC regulations, the 
number of vacancies that are filled falls from  V

  to  V
p
  with a concomitant decline in the 
likelihood of successful job-search from  v
  V/U   to  vp  Vp /U.   Then, the net change 
in social welfare, as a consequence of fair-employment regulation, is from equation (logn):  
J  vp1  Ip  v1  I  I  Ipv  vp  v1  Ip   #   
 
 
From equation (net), fair-employment regulation will, in the net, increase or decrease social 
welfare  J  0   or  J  0       if the positive effects on welfare of greater equality 
between Blacks and Whites in their likelihoods of successful job-search outweigh or are 
outweighed by the negative effects on welfare of a lowering in the overall likelihood of 
successful job-search. The term  vp  v1  Ip   in equation (net) represents the 
efficiency-loss from fair-employment regulation while, as noted earlier, the term  I  Ipv   
represents the equity-gain. 
Under regulation, the overall likelihood is equally distributed so that  v
p  vB
p  vW
p
  and  
Ip  0.   So, by the argument of the previous section,  J  0   if  vp  v   and  J  0   if  
vp  v,   where  v    is the ``equally distributed equivalent likelihood'' that is, the overall 
likelihood of successful job-search which, if equally distributed between Blacks and Whites 
would yield the same amount of social welfare as the distribution of likelihoods in the 
pre-regulatory state. In turn, the value of  v

 , depends on how averse society is to inequality 
with higher degrees of aversion leading to lower values of  v
.   If the inequality aversion 
parameter,    0,   then  v  v   and society would not be prepared to tolerate any 
efficiency-loss in exchange for equity-gains. On the other hand, for high degrees of inequality 
aversion, society would be prepared to accept relatively high efficiency losses in exchange for 
the equity-gains that fair-employment regulation confers. 
Diagrammatic Representation 
It may be useful to present an intuitive understanding of the approach towards measuring 
employment inequality, set out in the previous sections, in terms of a diagram. Diagram 1 
portrays a world of Black  B   and White  W   who ``share'' a given overall likelihood of 
successful job-search,  v   to obtain, respectively, their likelihoods of  v B   and  v W  . The 
horizontal axis measures  v W   and the vertical axis measures  v B .   The sharing equation (vu) 
may be simplified as:  
v  vBB  vWW   #    
 where:  W  UW/U   and  B  UB/U   are the respective proportions of White and Black 
persons in the total of unemployed persons. Equation (vu1) is represented by the 
``likelihood-possibility'' line  LL   in Diagram 1. The slope of  LL   is  W/B.   Each point on  
LL   represents a  vB,vW   combination that yields the value  v.   At the point  X,   which 
lies on the  45
0
  line passing through the origin,  vB  vW.   
<Diagram 1> 
Labour market outcomes may be viewed as a mapping from the parameters of the system,  
v,uB ,    uW,u,   (which define  LL   to a point on  LL.   Different outcomes will locate at 
different points on  LL.   Those that locate closer to the point  X   (for example, at  B   will 
be more egalitarian in terms of the distribution of the likelihood of successful job-search between 
Blacks and Whites than those which locate further away from  X   (for example, at  A.   For a 
given constellation of parameter values, Whites (at  L   on the horizontal axis) and Blacks (at  
L   on the vertical axis) can ``buy''  v/uW/u  and  v/1  uB/u  as their, respective, 
likelihoods of successful job-search. The quantities  B   and  W   may be interpreted as the 
``prices'' attached to the likelihood of successful job-search by, respectively, Blacks and Whites. 
The lower the proportion of White (Black) persons in the total of unemployed persons, the lower 
will the price of the likelihood of successful job search by Whites (Blacks). 
Superimposed upon the likelihood-possibility line in the diagram are the welfare indifference 
curves: each curve shows the different  vB ,vW   combinations that yield the same level of social 
welfare. From equation (SWF), the slope of any indifference curve is:  
J/vB
J/v W

BaB
WaW  
 and social welfare is maximised when the slope of the indifference curve = slope  LL   that is, 
when:  
BaB
WaW

B
W
 aB  aW
 
 and since the marginal utilities  aB   and  aW   diminish with increases in, respectively,  v B   
and  v W :   
aB  aW  vB  vW  
 so that  X   is the point at which the likelihood-possibility line,  LL,   is tangential to an 
indifference curve. If the labour market outcome is at the point  A  , with  vW  OF   and  
vB  AF   then this is equivalent, in welfare terms, to  vW  vB  CD.   The degree of 
inequality in labour market outcomes is, from equation (ATK):  1  CD/XY.   
A decrease in the number of vacancies filled, following an (fair-employment regulation induced) 
increase in the cost of filling vacancies, causes a parallel, inward shift in the 
likelihood-possibility line,  LL.   The extent of the shift will depend on the size of the 
efficiency-loss: the greater the loss, the more the likelihood-possibility line will shift inwards: at  
L1L1 ,   fair-employment regulation yields a net welfare gain; at  L3L3   it yields a net welfare 
loss; and at  L2L2   the net gain (loss) is zero. 
Differences in Black-White Worker Quality 
The fact that the likelihood of successful job-search by Blacks is less than that for Whites may be 
due to two reasons: (i) Blacks have less access to job-networks than do Whites; (ii) Whites, on 
average, are better (or perceived by employers to be better) workers than Blacks. In the 
preceding analysis the second point was assumed away: the labour market outcome, in terms of 
the different likelihoods of successful job-search, was at  A   in Diagram 1 entirely because 
Blacks had an ``access problem''; fair-employment regulation, by removing this problem, would 
shift the outcome from  A   to  X   . In the process, efficiency losses would cause an inward 
parallel shift in the likelihood possibility line but, as long as this shift stopped short of  L2L2 ,   
fair-employment regulation would confer a net welfare benefit. In this subsection the assumption 
of equal worker-quality is relaxed and it is assumed that Blacks, in terms of their likelihood of 
filling vacancies, suffer from the further handicap that, on average, they are not perceived (by 
employers) to be as good workers as Whites. 
<Diagram 2> 
In terms of Diagram 2, above, this quality constraint means that fair-employment regulation - by 
offering Blacks fair access to jobs - can only move the outcome from its pre-regulation point  A   
to the post-regulation point  B.   The segment  BX   along the likelihood-possibility line,  LL   
is inaccessible: even if information on vacancies was available to all, and even if recruitment 
practices were entirely fair and above-board, differences in average worker quality would mean 
that the likelihood of successful job search by Blacks could not be raised beyond  B.   The point  
B,   by eliminating one difficulty that Blacks faced, offers a higher level of welfare than  A  . In 
welfare terms, point  A   is equivalent to point  G.   At  G,   the relative likelihoods of 
successful job-search by Blacks and Whites is the same as at  B,   but the fact that the overall 
likelihood is lower at  G   than at  B  means that it offers a lower level of welfare. The overall 
likelihood of successful job search associated with  G   is  EF   where the point  E   lies at the 
intersection of  L
/L/   and the  45
0
  line,  OX.   This overall likelihood,  EF,   if distributed 
between Blacks and Whites according to the ratio given by the slope of  OB,   would yield the 
same level of welfare as obtained at point  A.   
Now if fair-employment regulation led to a decrease in the number of vacancies such that the 
likelihood-possibility line was shifted from (its original position of)  LL   to the left of  L
/L/   
then such regulation would lead to a net welfare loss. Indeed, the greater the bite of the 
quality-constaint - so that the closer  B  was to  A   - the more likely it would be that 
fair-employment regulation would lead to a welfare loss. Conversely, the closer  B   was to  X   
- that is, the less serious was the quality-constraint - the more likely would fair-employment 
regulation be to lead to welfare gain. In the final analysis, therefore, the likelihood that 
fair-employment regulation would increase welfare would depend upon the ``human-capital gap'' 
between Black and White workers. Nor could this gap be by-passed by interpreting 
fair-employment as positive discrimination rather than simply as affirmative action. Under 
postive discrimination a Black worker would fill a vacancy even in the presence of a superior 
White applicant: consequently, a move from  A   to  X   would be feasible. However, the 
employment, under postive discrimination, of less efficient workers than are available would 
lead the likelihood-possibility line to shift even further inwards: efficiency loss would now stem 
from the high post-regulatory cost of filling vacancies and from the fact that, owing to 
regulation, jobs are taken by less efficient (Black) workers while more able (White) workers 
remain unemployed. 
Conclusions 
The central conclusion of this paper is that any employment disadvantage that members of a 
particular group (or groups) suffer from may not necessarily stem from ``discrimination'' as it is 
usually understood in the literature. That is to say, this disadvantage is not necessarily the 
outcome of employer distaste towards, or social norms that restrict contact with, persons from 
that group. Nor need this disadvantage be based upon any perceived inferiority in terms of 
worker quality. Instead, as this paper suggested, the recruitment and selection procedures for 
filling vacancies disadvantages persons who are not part of, or are only peripherally attached to, 
the jobs-network. In other words, disadvantage is the result of a lack of access to jobs. 
Fair-employment regulation, by insisting that information about vacancies be widely 
disseminated and that recruitment and selection procedures are transparent and accountable, tries 
to ensure that all persons have fair access to jobs. But fair access comes at a cost. Hiring and 
firing costs rise in the wake of regulation and, as a consequence, fewer vacancies are advertised. 
In assessing the effects of regulation, the equity-gains which follow from it - and which 
constitute its raison-d'etre - must be compared to the concomitant efficiency losses, where both 
the gains and losses are measured in terms of social welfare. This paper suggested a method for 
making this comparison. It argued that the likelihood of a net social gain emerging from 
regulation would be less the greater the quality-gap between the groups. Indeed, it may be that 
the redressal of this quality gap should be at least as important a component of policy as the 
regulation to improve minority access to jobs. 
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